Property Law Symposium -- Regulatory Takings After the Supreme Court\u27s 1991-92 Term: An Evolving Return to Property Rights by Eagle, Steven J. & Mellor, William H., III
California Western Law Review 
Volume 29 Number 1 Article 8 
1992 
Property Law Symposium -- Regulatory Takings After the Supreme 
Court's 1991-92 Term: An Evolving Return to Property Rights 
Steven J. Eagle 
William H. Mellor III 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr 
Recommended Citation 
Eagle, Steven J. and Mellor, William H. III (1992) "Property Law Symposium -- Regulatory Takings After the 
Supreme Court's 1991-92 Term: An Evolving Return to Property Rights," California Western Law Review: 
Vol. 29 : No. 1 , Article 8. 
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol29/iss1/8 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by CWSL Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in California Western Law Review by an authorized editor of CWSL Scholarly Commons. For more 
information, please contact alm@cwsl.edu. 
REGULATORY TAKINGS AFTER THE SUPREME CouRT's
1991-92 TERM: AN EVOLVING RETURN
TO PROPERTY RIGHTS
STEVEN J. EAGLE* AND WILLIAM H. MELLOR Im**
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court continued during its 1991-92 Term what we regard
as its evolution towards increased recognition of the rights of landowners
faced with governmental restrictions amounting to regulatory takings.
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,' the Term's principal
property-rights decision, augments the constraints upon regulation developed
in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,2 Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission,3 and other recent cases.4 We regard these cases as constitut-
ing a "skeptical transition" from the Court's "regulatory model" that reached
its apogee in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City 5 to a post-
Lucas "property rights model" which would focus on property rights rather
than the police power and which would employ some form of heightened or
reasonable basis scrutiny. The Court's other 1991-92 property-rights cases,
PFZ Properties, Inc. v. Rodrigueze and Yee v. City of Escondido,7 appear
to fit within its pattern of tentatively exploring enhancements of property
rights prior to subsequent decisions in their favor.8
As one of the Term's "celebrated" cases, Lucas engendered considerable
immediate reaction.9 The consensus was that it "stopped well short of the
* Professor of Law, George Mason University; Senior Fellow, Institute for Justice. B.B.A.,
City College of New York; J.D., Yale Law School.
** President and General Counsel, Institute for Justice. B.S., Ohio State University; J.D.,
University of Denver.
Authors' note: The Institute for Justice had filed Amicus briefs in support of Petitioners in
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Commission (reprinted at 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1233 (1992))
and PFZ Properties, Inc. v. Rodriguez.
1. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992). See infra text accompanying notes 90-117.
2. 473 U.S. 432 (1985). See infra text accompanying notes 72-77.
3. 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987). See infra text accompanying notes 78-89.
4. We have in mind principally First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v.
County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987); and Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp., 485 U.S. 419, 440 (1982).
5. 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978). See infra text accompanying notes 69-71.
6. 928 F.2d 28 (1st Cir), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 414 (1991), cert. dismissed as
improvidently granted, 112 S. Ct. 1151 (1992). See discussion infra in text accompanying notes
134-39.
7. 112 S. Ct. 1522 (1992). See infra text accompanying notes 124-28 (holding in Yee); notes
175-83 (regulatory dicta in Yee).
8. See infra text accompanying notes 132-44.
9. See, e.g., Tom Kenworthy & Kirstin Downey, South Carolina May Have to Pay
Compensation in Property Case, WASH. POST, June 30, 1992, at A10.
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sweeping vindication of property rights that many conservatives had hoped
for."1" Some opponents of enhanced property rights were quick to write
the case off as "very narrow," and therefore as a "partial victory" for their
own side." Others noted more judiciously that Lucas "should not impede
the implementation of reasonable land-use limitations." 2 Some proponents
of private property rights treated Lucas as a major loss in which the Court
"blew" what was "a golden opportunity to straighten out" the law of
takings. 13
We believe that the substantial advancement of property rights implicit
in Lucas has been obscured by expectations of the "sweeping vindication"
sought by some and feared by others. For the Court to have radically
changed property rights doctrine in one fell swoop would have been an
unlikely outcome in any event. First, the Court's reluctance to make any but
incremental changes in property rights doctrine hardly is surprising, given its
checkered treatment of individuals' economic rights, 4 the elusive character
of the police power,"5 and the "inconsistent pronouncements" marking its
takings jurisprudence. 6  Second, a "sweeping vindication" would be
inconsistent with dicta in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania
v. Casey7 elaborating upon the Court's unwillingness to make radical
changes in controversial doctrine.
It is true that the history of property law in America always has reflected
the tension between liberal (Lockean) and republican (majoritarian) values. 8
However, as the first Justice Harlan observed, "[d]ue protection of the rights
of property has been regarded as a vital principle of republican institu-
tions."' 9 The Court's recent property jurisprudence may be rectifying the
balance.
10. Linda Greenhouse, The Supreme Court: Justices Ease Way to Challenge Land-Use Rules
That Prevent Development, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1992, at A18.
11. Tom Kenworthy & Kirstin Downey, South Carolina May Have to Pay Compensation in
Property Case, WASH. POST, June 30, 1992, at A10 (quoting John Echeverria, counsel for the
National Audubon Society).
12. Karen Riley, Land Ruling Called Overly Narrow, WASH. TIMES, June 30, 1992, at A4(quoting Jessica Landman, a lawyer with the Natural Resources Defense Council).
13. Id. (quoting Roger Pilon, Director of the Cato Institute's Center for Constitutional
Studies).
14. See infra text accompanying notes 38-40.
15. See infra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
16. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2894 n.7 (referring
specifically to difficulties in defining the extent of the property affecting which there may have
been a regulatory taking).
17. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). Casey was handed down the same day as Lucas. See infra text
accompanying notes 157-69.
18. See, e.g., JENNIFER NEDEISKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN
CONSaTUTIONA11SM (1990); Frank Michelman, Tutelary Jurisprudence and Constitutional
Liberty, in LIBERTY, PROPERTY, AND THE FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 127
(Ellen Frankel Paul & Howard Dickman, eds., 1990).
19. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 235 (1897).
[Vol. 29
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I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE REGULATORY MODEL:
MUGLER TO PENN CENTRAL
A. Private Property Rights and the Police Power
The Supreme Court has noted that property rights "are not created by the
Constitution... but rather are "created" and "defined" by "existing rules
or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state
law.... "I As early as 1792, a South Carolina court had declared that "it
was against common right, as well as against magna charta, to take away the
freehold of one man and vest it in another."21 This "historical compact"
is at the heart of Lucas.'
Several Constitutional provisions explicitly protect private property
rights. The federal government is constrained by the Due Process Clauses
and the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. State governments also
are constrained by Takings Clause through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.' Implicit Constitutional protection of property is
provided by, among other provisions, the Contracts Clause of Article I'
The notion that both natural law and the Contracts Clause protected the
individual's property rights was encapsulated in Professor Corwin's notion
of "vested rights."'
20. Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161 (1980) (quoting Board
of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)).
21. Bowman v. Middleton, 1 Bay 252, 254 (S.C. 1792), quoted in JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE
GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 78
(1992).
22. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992). "[Tlhe notion.., that
title [to land] is somehow held subject to the 'implied limitation' that the State may subsequently
eliminate all economically valuable use is inconsistent with the historical compact recorded in
the Takings Clause that has become part of our constitutional culture." Id. at 2900.
23. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall... be deprived of... property, without due
process of law . . ").
24. Id. amend. V ([N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.").
25. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
26. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV ("Nor shall any State deprive any person of... property,
without due process of law .... ").
27. Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 ("No state shall... pass any ... Law impairing the Obligation of
Contracts .... ). See, e.g., United States Trust Co. of New York v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1
(1977) (invalidating retroactive repeal of bond covenant); Chicago Bd. of Realtors, Inc. v. City
of Chicago, 819 F.2d 732, 744 (Posner, J., concurring) (1987) (Contracts Clause has been
interpreted to mean little, at least when government not a party); Richard A. Epstein, Toward
a Revitalization of the Contract Clause, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 703 (1984).
28. The concept of vested rights "was that the effect of legislation on existing property rights
was a primary test of its validity; for if these were essentially impaired then some clear
constitutional justification must be found for the legislation or it must succumb to judicial
condemnation." EDWARD CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT 72 (1948), quoted in
RONALD D. ROTUNDA, ET AL., TREATISE ON CONSTITUT[ONALLAW, SUBSTANCE & PROCEDURE
§ 15.1, at 30-31 (1986).
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Yet from the beginning the courts have grappled with the tension
between the need to protect property rights and the emergence of the police
power. The so-called "police power " 21 has been the basis for governmental
regulation of real property. While there are earlier instances of its employ-
ment,' regulation of land use through the police power conventionally is
traced to the 1887 case of Mugler v. Kansas." The Supreme Court upheld
a prohibition ordinance which had closed a existing brewery. It rejected the
plaintiff's argument that his premises did not constitute a nuisance, on the
grounds that the state could protect against the injurious consequences of
alcohol as it saw fit. No showing was required of special harm, or that
society could not be protected through less drastic means. Furthermore, "a
prohibition simply upon the use of property for purposes that are declared,
by valid legislation, to be injurious to the public health, morals or safety of
the community, cannot in any sense, be deemed a taking or an appropriation
of property for the public benefit."3' Under Mugler, regulations could and
did deprive owners of most of the value of their property. 3
Mugler reflected earlier Supreme Court cases conditioning a "taking" on
a "direct appropriation"' or a "practical ouster of [the owner's] posses-
sion."" But, as Justice Holmes explained in 1922, in Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon,' the result of a juxtaposition of compensable appropriations
and non-compensable regulations would be the "natural tendency of human
nature to extend the qualification more and more until at last private property
disappear[ed]." Thus, "while property may be regulated to some extent, if
regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking."'
29. A fairly comprehensive definition is contained in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53
(1905):
There are, however, certain powers existing in the sovereignty of each State in the
Union, somewhat vaguely termed police powers, the exact description and limitation
of which have not been attempted by the courts. Those powers, broadly stated and
without, at present, any attempt at a more specific limitation, relate to the safety,
health, morals and general welfare of the public.
30. E.g., Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge Co., 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837)(interpreting bridge charter so as to allow the state to protect against monopoly).
31. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
32. Id. at 668-69.
33. See, e.g., Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (upholding restriction against
preexisting brickyard now encroached by urban development, with 87 percent reduction in
value). The police power is "one of the most essential ... [and] least limitable" powers of
government. Id. at 410.
34. Legal Tender Cases, 80 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 551 (1871).
35. Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 642 (1879).
36. 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (holding that a coal company could not be forbidden to exploit its
mineral estate by a regulation designed to protect the surface owner).
37. Id. at 414-15.
[Vol. 29
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The national citizenship provided by the post-Civil War Fourteenth
Amendment 8 on its face supported property rights, but the Court's initial
reading of these restrictions on state authority in The Slaughter-House
Cases39 was narrow.4 However, in Munn v. Illinois,4 1 it announced that
while it was upholding state regulation of grain elevator rates because grain
elevators were "affected with a public interest," 42 "mere private contracts"
could not be so regulated 43
The best known of the economic substantive due process cases, Lochner
v. New York," the Court struck down a New York statute restricting the
weekly working hours of bakers. Refusing to deem the restriction a health
or safety measure, the Court found that it violated the employer and
employees' liberty of contract-a right protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. However, the difficulty in discerning what businesses or restrictions
were "affected with a public interest" and the intense New Deal opposition
culminating in President Roosevelt's "court packing plan" led the Court to
change direction. In Nebbia v. New York,45 it held that "a state is free to
adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote
public welfare."' In West Coast Hotel v. Parrish,47 the Court overruled
Adkins v. Children's Hospital, which on substantive due process grounds,
had invalidated, minimum wage laws for women."
Finally, in United States v. Carolene Products Co.,' the Court
established the now-familiar dichotomy between general economic and social
legislation on the one hand, and statutes affecting purported fundamental
constitutional values on the other. Justice Stone declared that "[R]egulatory
legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to be pronounced
unconstitutional unless . . . it is of such a character as to preclude the
38. U.S. CONST. amend. IV, § I ("No State shall... abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny . . .equal protection of the laws.").
39. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873) (holding that state-granted monopoly on slaughtering in New
Orleans area was not violative of butchers' property or rights without due process of law).
40. Disagreement about the case remains intense. See, e.g., CUNT BOUCK, UNFINISHED
BUSINESS 37 (1990) ("a dark day for civil rights"); ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF
AMERICA 39 (1990) ("a narrow victory for judicial moderation"); LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTUTIONAL LAW 555 (2d ed. 1988) ("unwittingly... a first step toward the
recognition of substantive due process").
41. 94 U.S. (4 Otto) 113 (1877).
42. Id. at 130.
43. Id. at 134.
44. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
45. 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (upholding state regulatory scheme for milk production).
46. Id. at 537.
47. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
48. 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
49. 304 U.S. 144 (1938) (upholding conviction of producer of "filed milk" (i.e., skim milk
with vegetable oil added) for shipping produce in interstate commerce in violation of federal
statute).
213
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assumption that it rests on some rational basis.... ."I The famous51
footnote 4 added: "There may be narrower scope for operation of the
presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be
within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten
amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced
within the Fourteenth.... 52
Since Carolene Products, the Supreme Court has not considered
legislation on a substantive due process basis. Rather, the focus for
protection of individual rights has been the concept of "equal protection,"
applicable to the states and their subdivisions under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and to the federal government under
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 53 It is conventional to
note that the Supreme Court reviews governmental statutes and regulations
under three levels of scrutiny. The basic level, "rational basis" (in fact
"conceivable basis") is used for the general run of economic and social
legislation.' Indeed, where legislation has failed to state a conceivable
purpose, the Court itself has furnished it." Under the "intermediate test,"
the Court will not uphold a classification unless is has a "substantial
relationship" to an "important" governmental interest. This test is used for
gender' and illegitimacy 7 classifications. The "strict scrutiny" test for
classifications based upon race or national origin requires a "compelling"
governmental need, with the means "narrowly tailored. " "
In some cases, however, the Court has not been clear about which tier
of scrutiny it is employing. In others, the Court has, sub rosa, departed
from the three-tier framework. 9
50. Id. at 152.
51. This footnote has been styled by Justice Powell "the most celebrated footnote in
constitutional law." Lewis Powell, Carolene Products Revisited, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1087,
1087 (1982).
52. 304 U.S. at 252-53 n.4.
53. See, e.g., Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954); Kenneth Karst, The Fifih Amendment's
Guarantee of Equal Protection, 55 N.C. L. REv. 540 (1977).
54. See, e.g., Allied Stores v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 530 (1959) (in discerning rationality,
the Court would generally uphold any classification based "upon a state of facts that reasonably
can be conceived to constitute a distinction, or difference, in state policy").
55. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (hypothesizingjustifications for statute prohibiting opticians from replacing broken lenses without a new
prescription).
56. See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (striking state law providing for alimony only
to wives).
57. See, e.g., Clark v..Jeter, 486 U.S. 456 (1988) (striking limitation on paternity suits by
illegitimate children).
58. See, e.g., Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
59. For a treatment of these issues and possible use by the Court of a heightened scrutiny or
"reasonable basis" test for restrictions on property rights, see discussion infra part III.F.
[-%ol. 29
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B. Regulatory takings from Euclid to Penn Central
The Court's sweeping approval of comprehensive zoning in 1926, in
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,' was both a significant extension
of police power regulation and a precursor of the later New Deal cases.
Justice Sutherland's opinion was based on little more than fleeting references
to fire, congestion and disease, all of which could have been dealt with
individually on a more limited basis. 1 After Euclid, the Court basically has
left zoning regulation to the states. Its few cases established the contours of
what we would now call "spot zoning;" 2 permitted zoning favoring' (but
not disfavoring)6' traditional families; and permitted separate zoning
districts for "adult" theatres.'
Most germane, the Court, in Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead,' upheld
a zoning ordinance which in effect terminated a long-existing quarry. The
regulation was held to further the interests of the public, be reasonably
necessary to accomplish the public purpose, and "not [be] unduly oppressive
upon individuals."67 The last point was to figure prominently in Agins v.
Tiburon, where the Court held that land use regulation does not effect a
taking if it "substantially advance[s] legitimate state interests" and does not
"den[y] an owner economically viable use of his land."'
In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, perhaps the best-
known regulatory takings case, the City had disapproved a plan to build a
fifty-five-story office complex on top of Grand Central Terminal.'
Although the proposal met planning and zoning requirements in all other
respects, it was rejected to protect the aesthetic values of the Terminal, one
of the best examples of Beaux-Arts architecture in the United States. Justice
60. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). Justice George Sutherland, one of the "four horsemen" of
substantive due process, intended a "conservative" result in Euclid--the protection of established
residential districts from urban disruption. See Hadley Arkes, Who's the Laissez-Fairest of Them
All, POL'Y REV., Spring 1992, at 78, 84-85. The almost casual way in which Justice Sutherland
classified apartment houses as "very near to being nuisances," however, has given almost carte
blanche to revolutionary control of land use by government. 272 U.S. at 395.
61. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN 131-34 (1985).
62. Washington ex rel. Seattle Title & Trust Co. v. Roeberg, 278 U.S. 116 (1928)
(conditioning zoning variance on vote of neighbors arbitrary and capricious). But see Eastlake
v. Forrest City Enters., Inc., 426 U.S. 668 (1976) (upholding exemption granted in general
referendum); Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928) (holding that spot zoning
depriving owner of most value did not bear substantial relation to general welfare).
63. Village of Belle Terre v.Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (upholding zoning limiting number
of unrelated persons who could live in each house).
64. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (overturning zoning that split a
family related by blood).
65. Young v. American Mini-Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
66. 369 U.S. 590, 595 (1962).
67. Id.
68. 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
69. 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978).
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William Brennan, writing for the Court, noted that there was no "'set
formula' for determining when 'justice and fairness' require that economic
injuries caused by public action be compensated by the government." He
went on to balance the interests of the parties, considering (1) the economic
impact on the claimant, (2) the "extent to which the regulation ... interfered
with investment-backed expectations," and (3) the character or extent of the
government action.' He concluded that there was not a taking, since the
station had not been physically changed by the regulation, the plaintiff could
continue its existing use, and the restriction did not violate any original
investment-backed expectation. Furthermore, he implied that the "transfer
development rights" (TDRs) plaintiffs received for use elsewhere might have
been adequate compensation.7'
II. THE SKEPTICAL TRANSrrION: CLEBuRNE, NoLLAN, AND LucAS
A. Cleburne and Covert Heightened Scrutiny
In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,' the Court subjected to
what Professor Tribe has called "covert heightened scrutiny"' the denial
of a special use permit for a group home for thirteen mentally retarded
persons.7' It purported not to find the retarded a "suspect class," and to
apply the rational basis test generally employed for economic or social
legislation.'
To withstand equal protection review, legislation that distinguishes
between the mentally retarded and others must be rationally related to a
legitimate governmental purpose. This standard, we believe, affords
government the latitude necessary both to pursue policies designed to assist
the retarded in realizing their full potential, and to freely and efficiently
engage in activities that burden the retarded in what is essentially an
incidental manner. The State may not rely on a classification whose
relationship to an asserted goal is so attenuated as to render the distinction
arbitrary or irrational. 76
However, the Court's penetrating inquiry into the facts resulted in a finding
that there was no rationality in any of the City's proffered justifications.
70. Id. at 124.
71. Id. at 137 ("While these rights may well not have constituted 'just compensation' if a
'taking' had occurred, the rights nevertheless undoubtedly mitigate whatever financial burdens
the law has imposed on appellants and, for that reason, are to be taken into account in
considering the impact of regulation.")
72. 473 U.S. 432 (1985). For a discussion of the future impact of Cleburne, see text
associated with infra notes 246-49.
73. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AmERcAN CONSTrn oNAL LAW 1612 (2d ed. 1988).
74. 473 U.S. at 435-37.
75. Id. at 440-47.
76. Id. at 446 (the phrase to which emphasis has been added is a standard formulation of the
"rational basis" test).
[Vol. 29
8
California Western Law Review, Vol. 29 [1992], No. 1, Art. 8
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol29/iss1/8
1992] REGULATORY TAKINGS AFTER THE 1991-92 TERM
This is in sharp contrast with the deference normally associated with rational
basis review.
Cleburne compared the types of neighborhood problems apt to be
presented by a group home for the retarded (for which a special use permit
was needed) with those problems presented by hotels and fraternity houses
(for which the existing neighborhood zoning sufficed). Unsurprisingly, the
Court concluded that the problems were similar and that there was no
rational basis for the stricter requirements imposed on the group home. '
The only thing remarkable in this attempt to discern whether the city had a
legitimate purpose for its zoning regulations and a zoning scheme rationally
designed to further those purposes was that the Court actually engaged in it.
B. Nollan and the "Sufficient Nexus"
In Nollan v. California Costal Commission,7" the Supreme Court
applied the "nexus" test to takings and police power regulation with new
vigor."' Nollan conceded the Commission had the authority to deny his
application to reconstruct and extend his house on the beach pursuant to its
mandate to protect views of the ocean from the public highway. The
Commission did not deny the application outright, but rather conditioned it
on Nollan's grant to the public of a lateral easement that would allow people
to walk along the shore behind Nollan's house between the parks on both
sides of Nollan's lot.' The Commission argued that greater powers include
lesser powers, and that its uncontradicted right to prohibit construction
altogether allowed it to approve construction on conditions.
The Commission argues that a permit condition that serves the same
legitimate police-power purpose as a refusal to issue the permit should not
be found to be a taking if the refusal to issue the permit would not
constitute a taking. We agree .... The evident constitutional propriety
disappears, however, if the condition substituted for the prohibition utterly
fails to further the end advanced as the justification for the prohibition.
When that essential nexus is eliminated, the situation becomes the same as
if California law forbade shouting fire in a crowded theater, but granted
dispensations to those willing to contribute $100 to the state treasury....
. Similarly here, the lack of nexus between the condition and the original
purpose of the building restriction converts that purpose to something other
than what it was. The purpose then becomes, quite simply, the obtaining
77. Id. at 449 (discussing the site's location within a "five hundred year flood plain," and
general concerns about municipal liability for resident conduct).
78. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
79. Ends-means analysis in a Takings Clause context did not originate in Nollan, but rather
had been used by courts and scholars from time to time. See, e.g., John J. Costonis,
Presumptive and Per Se Takings: A Decisional Model for the Taking Issue, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV.
465, 490 (1983); Frank Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1193-94 (1967).
80. 483 U.S. at 287-89.
217
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of an easement to serve some valid governmental purpose, but without
payment of compensation."'
The fact that Nollan posed a grave threat to conceivable basis scrutiny'
led to its vituperative condemnation. One leading authority, Professor
Michelman, declared:
In Nollan ... the Court did rely outright and crucially on its own
censorious appraisal of instrumental efficacy in condemning as an
uncompensated taking a regulation that in its degree of onerousness did not
remotely approach the level of a total denial of economic value or
"viability." What is even more striking is that the Court expressly
endorsed a form of semi-strict or heightened judicial scrutiny of regulatory
means-ends relationships *** Who knows how many land-use regulations,
hitherto thought virtually immune from federal judicial censorship, might
be destined for doom at the hands of lower federal courts now supremlylicensed to apply to them an intensified means-ends scrutiny?sn
It was Michelman's hope that Nollan would be less than it seemed, and
that its "heightened scrutiny lesson" would be, in effect, a manifestation of
the "talismanic force of 'permanent physical occupation'" 8" in LorettoYs
Otherwise, he warned, we would be faced with "Lochner redivivus. "86
Nollan, in tandem with CleburneW7 and Lucas,88 will play a central role inthe development of regulatory takings law.o9
C. Lucas and the Propery-Based Inquiry
The Petitioner in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Councilr° was one
of a group of developers who built a beachfront residential subdivision on a
barrier island near Charleston. As the project wound down, Lucas purchased
two of the remaining lots for his own account for $975,000. He planned to
construct residences, as the owners of the immediately adjacent lots had
already done.9' One of these residences was to be for his personal use and
the other for resale. Lucas commissioned architectural drawings. Under
81. Id. at 836-837.
82. See supra text accompanying note 54.
83. Frank Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1607-08 (1988).
84. Id. at 1608.
85. Lnretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
86. Michelman, supra note 83, at 1609.
87. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985). See supra text
accompanying notes 72-77.
88. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992). See mnfra text
accompanying notes 90-117.
89. See infra part III.B.
90. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
91. Id. at 72889.
[P1ol. 29
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existing law, he was entitled to build the houses without further governmental
permission.'
Thereafter the State enacted a Beachfront Management Act (BMA),
under which "construction of occupiable improvements" on Lucas's land
"was flatly prohibited."' 3 The few permissible improvements included
"wooden walkways" and "small wooden decks."' The South Carolina trial
court found that this permanent ban on construction "deprive[d] Lucas of any
reasonable economic use of the lots,.., eliminated the unrestricted right of
use, and render[ed] them valueless."95
While it is doubtful that the lots were in fact "valueless,"' 6 Justice
Scalia held that the State had waived its right to contest the issue.'
The Court's holding is quite narrow:
[R]egulations that prohibit all economically beneficial use of land
... cannot be newly legislated or decreed (without compensation), but
must inhere in the title itself, in the restrictions that background principles
of the State's law of property and nuisance already place upon land
ownership. A law or decree with such an effect must, in other words, do
no more than duplicate the result that could have been achieved in the
courts-by adjacent landowners... under the State's law of private
nuisance, or by the State [under public nuisance], or otherwise [principally
to cope with "grave threats to the life and property of others"].'
Whether such restrictions inhered in Lucas's title, the permanence of the
regulations, whether he should be compelled to seek a special permit to
build, and the amount of damages all were remanded to the South Carolina
courts. 99
92. Id.
93. Id. Subsequent to argument in the South Carolina Supreme Court, but prior to release
of its opinion, the BMA was amended so as to permit landowners like Lucas to request a
"special permit" permitting construction. The court declined the Coastal Council's invitation
to decide the case on ripeness grounds, and instead based its decision on the merits. While this
disposition would allow Lucas to petition for a permit in the future, the U. S. Supreme Court
held that it disposed on the merits Lucas's takings claim for the period prior to the amendment.
Id. at 2891 (citing First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los
Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987) (holding temporary deprivations of use are compensable under
the Takings Clause)).
94. 112 S. Ct. at 2890 n.2.
95. 112 S. Ct. at 2890.
96. Because the trial court had "accepted no evidence from the State on the property's value
without a home, and petitioner's appraiser testified that he never had considered what the value
would be absent a residence," the decision was "almost certainly erroneous." 112 S. Ct. 2904,
2908 (Blaekmun, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy termed the finding "curious." 112 S. Ct. at
2903 (Kennedy, J. concurring).
97. The State had not challenged the finding in its brief in opposition to the petition for
certiorari, and the Court "decline[d] to entertain" it in the State's brief on the merits. 112 S.
Ct. at 2896 n.9.
98. 112 S. Ct. at 2900 & n.16.
99. 112 S. Ct. at 2902 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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Prior to Lucas, the Court's only explicit exception to the Penn Cen-
tral"° balancing test was the holding in Loretto"0' that permanent physical
intrusions would be compensable regardless of any public purpose to the
regulation. In Lucas, Justice Scalia stated that the Court had "described at
least two" discrete categories of regulatory action as compensable without
case-specific inquiry into the public interest advanced.... .1o "The second
situation in which we have found categorical treatment appropriate is where
regulation denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land. ""
Justice Scalia, placing principal reliance on the Court's unanimous opinion
Agins v. Tiburon,"° that "the Fifth Amendment is violated when land-use
regulation 'does not substantially advance legitimate state interests or denies
an owner economically viable use of his land.' "" Justice Blackmun,
dissenting in Lucas, argued that the belated discovery of a new "per se rule"
in Agins was "unpersuasive,"'" and that other language in Agins asserted
that "no precise rule determines when property has been taken" and required
"a weighing of public and private interest."" ° It is not clear whether the
limitation of the per se rule to deprivations of pecuniary value is of
independent significance, whether it simply tracks the language of Agins and
prior cases, or whether it merely reflects the Court's long-standing interpreta-
tion of the Just Compensation Clause limiting remuneration to market
values."' ° Justice Scalia asserts that the Court will remain sensitive to non-
pecuniary interests." 9
Justice Scalia suggested that the basis for the rule might be that "total
deprivation of beneficial use is, from the landowner's point of view, the
equivalent of a physical appropriation," and that "in the extraordinary
circumstance when no productive or economically beneficial use of land is
permitted, it is less realistic to indulge our usual assumption that the
100. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978). See supra text
accompanying notes 69-71.
101. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435-440 (1982). See
supra text accompanying notes 118-23.
102. 112 S. Ct. at 2893.
103. Id.
104. 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (upholding "open space" zoning, but not reaching inverse condem-
nation issue).
105. 112 S. Ct. at 2893 (quoting 447 U.S. at 260).
106. 112 S. Ct. at 2911 n. 11 (Blackmun, J. dissenting) (citing 447 U.S. at 260-262) ("Mhe
conclusion that a regulation is not on its face a taking because it allows the landowner some
economic use of property is a far cry from the proposition that denial of such use is sufficient
to establish a taking claim regardless of any other consideration.").
107. 112 S. Ct. at 2911 n.ll (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
108. Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934) (entitling owner to be placed "in as
good a position pecuniarily as if his property had not been taken"); Kimball Laundry Co. v.
United States, 338 U.S. 1, 5 (1949) ("loss to the owner of non-transferable values deriving from
his unique need for property or idiosyncratic attachment to it ... is properly treated as part of
the burden of common citizenship").
109. 112 S. Ct. at 2895 (citing the interest in excluding strangers protected in Loretto, 458
U.S. at 3176).
220 [VTol. 29
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legislature is simply 'adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic
life'.""11 The affirmative side of the compensation requirement, he further
suggested, is that a total elimination of value typically occurs when land is
required to be left in its natural state, and that this presents "a heightened
risk that private property is being pressed into some form of public service
under the guise of mitigating serious public harm.""'
Central to Lucas is the idea that traditional land use regulation is based
not upon "nuisance" as such, but upon securing what Justice Holmes in
Mahon called an "average reciprocity of advantage.""' Under this view,
the harmful or noxious uses principle should be recast to reflect the
underlying reality that regulations are imposed when they are expected to
produce a widespread public benefit and to be applicable to all similarly
situated property.13
However, according to Justice Scalia, in many cases regulations
purporting to be "harm-preventing" equally could be cast as "benefit-confer-
ring." Thus the South Carolina regulation might be viewed as preventing
harm to the ecology, or, alternatively, conferring the benefit of preservation
of benefit upon it. Putting it another way, both economists" 4 and environ-
mentalists" 5 realize that the essential problem is one of incompatibility of
legitimate activities. Were the legislature's characterization to be determina-
tive of compensability, only a "stupid staff" would write rules purporting to
confer benefits." 6
With the nature of the regulation thus indeterminate, the answer must lie
in the nature of the landowner's property right.
Where the State seeks to sustain regulation that deprives land of all
economically beneficial use, we think it may resist compensation only if the
logically antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner's estate shows that
the proscribed use interests were not part of his title to begin with." 7
D. Some Further Indications of Skepticism:
Loretto, First English, and PFZ
In Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,"' the owner of a
small apartment building resisted the state statute mandating that she allow
110. 112 S. Ct. at 2894 (quoting Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124).
111. 112 S. Ct. at 2894.
112. 112 S. Ct. at 2894 (quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415(1922)).
113. 112 S. Ct. at 2897.
114. The seminal analysis is R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1
(1960).
115. 112 S. Ct. at 2898 (citing Joseph Sax, Takings and the Policy Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36,
49 (1964)).
116. 112 S. Ct. at 2897-2899.
117. Id. at 2899.
118. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
19921
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the cable company to install wires and connection boxes on her building for
service to the tenants."1 9 Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, concluded
that "a permanent physical occupation authorized by government is a taking
without regard to the public interests that it may serve. " 20 In some ways
Loretto is a curious departure from Penn Central. If the authorization had
been temporary, a balancing test would have been employed. Under a
balancing test, it is unlikely that Mrs. Loretto would have prevailed."' As
Justice Blackmun noted in dissent, the physical impact of the installation
could not be greater than those of the signs, tenant mailboxes, sprinklers and
other safety features that typically are mandated for residential rental
buildings.1" The only difference seemed to be the formal one of owner-
ship-the landlord would own the mailboxes whereas a "stranger" would
own the cable boxes.
In spite of the force of Justice Blackmun's arguments, the majority found
in the permanent physical taking a right that deserved protection under the
Constitution. Professor Tribe, raising the specter of a familiar bite noire,
regards "the Court's Constitution ... as Lochner-style common law.123
Perhaps he accurately intuits the Court's uneasiness with Penn Central
balancing as capable of discerning all rights deserving of protection.
The Court in April, 1992, refused to extend Loretto in Yee v. City of
Escondido."2 Certiorari had been granted on the sole issue of whether the
transfer of premium value as representing the right to occupancy at a reduced
rent constituted a taking."Z The Court affirmed for the city, on the ground
that a permanent physical taking precluded the landlord's right to terminate
the business and evict the tenants on six or twelve months notice.as While
119. Id. at 421-24.
120. Id. at 426.
121. The installation was small, consisting of two 1.5 square-foot cable boxes and runs of
cable along the roof and down the sides of the building. The statute articulated the purpose of
ensuring that tenants had access to educational television. The landlord was entitled to a $1 fee,
indemnification for any injuries, and an installation that reasonably conformed to safety and
aesthetic requirements. 458 U.S. at 423-24.
122. 458 U.S. at 452 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
123. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTTUTIONAL LAW 604 (2d ed. 1988).
124. 112 S. Ct. 1522 (1992).
125. Id. at 1533.
126. "A different case would be presented were the statute, on its face or as applied, to
compel a landowner over objection to rent his property or to refrain in perpetuity from
terminating a tenancy." 112 S. Ct. at 1529. This holding seems at variance with a footnote in
Loretto stating that "a landlord's ability to rent his property may not be conditioned on his
forfeiting the right to compensation for a physical occupation." 458 U.S. at 439 n.17.
Furthermore, it is by no means clear that it is practicable for a California mobile home park
owner to obtain the permits necessary to discontinue business and evict the tenants. Hall v. City
of Santa Barbara, 833 F.2d 1270, 1278 n.18 (9th Cir. 1986).
[Vol. 29
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the holding was routine," 7 Justice O'Connor's opinion contains significant
dicta on regulatory takings in general.' ts
In First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Los
Angeles," the Court held that governmental entities did not have the right
to impose regulations that could be withdrawn without compensation in the
event the courts determined they constituted a taking. Rather, the property
owner would be entitled to temporary damages for the period that the
regulation was in force. 3 First English is both an extension of the
principle that the Takings Clause is self-executing13' and a rejection of the
California Supreme Court's holding in Agins v. Tiburon"3 that effectively
placed the burden of doubt about whether a regulation constitutes a taking
upon the landowner.133
In PFZ Properties, Inc. v. Rodriguez," the Supreme Court had
granted certiorari on the issue of whether an allegation of arbitrary,
capricious, or illegal denial of a construction permit to a developer by
officials acting under color of state law stated a due process claim under 42
U.S.C. section 1983.135 While the pleadings suggested egregious interfer-
ence with the plaintiffs rights, 13 the District Court dismissed PFZ's federal
claim on the grounds that deprivations of economic rights were not protected
127. Supreme Court review probably was granted because of the widespread disruptions that
otherwise would occur. 112 S. Ct. at 1534. The California appellate decision in Yee supported
the tenant. 274 Cal. Rptr. 551, 556 (App. 1990), review denied, 1991 Cal. Lexis 353. Ninth
Circuit precedent supported the landlord. Hall v. City of Santa Barbara, 833 F.2d 1270 (9th
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 940 (1988) (upholding cause of action). Accord, Pinewood
Estates of Michigan v. Barnegat Township Leveling Board, 898 F.2d 347 (3d Cir. 1990); see
also Azul Pacifico, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 948 F.2d 575 (1991) (holding based on Hall).
128. See infra text accompanying notes 175-83.
129. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
130. Id. at 317-20.
131. See United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980).
132. 598 P.2d 25 (1979), aff'd on other grounds, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
133. Under the California Supreme Court's view, maintenance of a "regulatory" takings suit
would allow the landowner to force the legislature to exercise its power of eminent domain.
That court therefore determined that compensation would not be required until after both a
judicial determination that the regulation constituted a taking and a decision by the government
to continue the regulation in effect. 447 U.S. at 263. The effect, of course, would be to
discourage landowner suits. Successful landowners would recover compensation only from a
date sometime after they prevailed in court, and only if the government did not withdraw. If
inverse condemnation succeeded without challenge, government would profit. If a challenge was
successful, government could withdraw and not loose.
134. 928 F.2d 28 (1st Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 414 (1991), cert. dismissed as
improvidently granted, 112 S. Ct. 1151 (1992).
135. 112 S. Ct. 414 (1991).
136. PFZ had owned over 1,300 acres in Puerto Rico, on which it wanted to build a large
residential and tourist development. The first phase would consist of 4,000 units. 928 F.2d at
29. PFZ claimed that government officials had for 11 years deliberately delayed processing and
illegally refused to process construction drawings, and that their deliberate actions (including
such chicanery as the wrongful removal of documents from files) deprived PFZ of its
constitutional rights to procedural and substantive due process and to equal protection. Id. at
30-32.
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by the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.137 PFZ was relegated
to its right to appeal the eventual agency determinations under Puerto Rican
law."' The First Circuit upheld the ruling, noting that PFZ's claims did
not involve racial animus, political discrimination, or fundamental procedural
irregularity. 13 9
After oral argument the Supreme Court dismissed certiorari as improvi-
dently granted."4 Perhaps the Court recognized that it had little basis upon
which to decide PFZ other than through mere affirmance of the holding
below or through a full-blown reconsideration of the role of the Fourteenth
Amendment in protecting economic liberty-an approach that would require
its reappraisal of The Slaughter-House Cases.4 The Court clearly is
unwilling to go that far. For the Court to put its toe in the water in such a
way would not be novel. Indeed, its jurisprudence leading up to Nollan42
and First English43 was marked with just such false starts.144
III. THE CONTINUING EVOLUTION ToWARD PROPERTY RIGHTS
A. General Comments
Our analysis thus far suggests that takings law is evolving in the
direction of increased recognition of private property rights.
One approach to property rights would be to continue with the "conceiv-
able basis" 45 and Penn Central balancing tests"4 as before. Unfortunate-
ly, as both scholarly 47 and practical accounts 4 have demonstrated, land
137. "[Nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law ... "
138. 739 F.Supp. 67 (D.P.R. 1990).
139. 928 F.2d 28, 30 (lst Cir. 1991).
140. 112 S. Ct. 1151 (1992).
141. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873) (holding state-granted monopoly on slaughtering in New
Orleans area not violative of butchers property or rights without due process of law).
142. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
143. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304
(1987).
144. Prior to its 1987 cases, the Supreme Court had indicated a tentative interest in the takings
area by granting certiorari in several cases and then by avoiding a decision on the merits. See
Agins v. City ofTiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980); Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n
v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985); MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v.
Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340 (1986); San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S.
621 (1981) (each avoiding the compensation issue by ruling on procedural grounds or
"ripeness").
145. See supra text accompanying note 54.
146. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978). See supra text
accompanying notes 69-71.
147. E.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis,
86 YALE L.J. 385 (1977), WILLUAM FIScHEL, THE ECONOMICS OF ZONING LAWS (1985).
148. E.g., RICHARD F. BABCOCK & CHARLES L. SIEMON, THE ZONING GAME REVISITED
(1985).
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use controls serve most often to allow residents of homogeneous suburbs to
enrich themselves by enacting drastic curbs on growth at the expense of
owners of vacant land and prospective residents (who often are younger, less
affluent, and more likely to be members of minority groups than the existing
residents). The practical effects of this are enormous. For instance, a recent
presidential "Advisory Commission on Regulatory Barriers to Affordable
Housing" report149 found affordability problems in the suburbs to be
principally growth controls, restrictive and exclusionary zoning, excessive
subdivision controls, inequitable fees on development, and burdensome and
uncoordinated approval and permitting systems.1" In the cities, compara-
ble problems were restrictions on urban renewal, rent control, restrictions on
low-cost housing, regulatory restrictions on certain types of housing, and
reinvestment in older urban neighborhoods."'
A different approach would intensify regulation to check the admitted
excesses of regulators. Professor Carol Rose, noting that "land use
regulators became accustomed to believing that they were entitled to regulate
anything that they pleased under the auspices of Euclidean zoning," 52
advocated a greater role for government, now in the form of the state
legislature. As she notes, such "regulation of the regulators" in part targets
"externalities that local regulation might create." 53 However, it also makes
it easier for interest groups to capture land use regulationM and eliminates
the incentive for similar jurisdictions to compete for residents by offering
better services and lower taxes. 55 While excessive land use regulation has
resulted in great burdens being placed upon ordinary citizens as well as on
developers,156 a "hair of the dog" solution lacks promise.
149. REPORT TO PRESIDENT BUSH AND SECRETARY KEMP OF THE ADVISORY COMMISSION
OF REGULATORY BARRIERS TO AFFORDABLE HOUSING, NOT IN MY BACK YARD: REMOVING
BARRIERS TO AFFORDABLE HOUSING (1990).
150. Id. at 11:1-14.
151. Id. at III:1-14.
152. Carol M. Rose, Property Rights, Regulatory Regimes and the New Takings
Jurisprudence-An Evolutionary Approach, 57 TENN. L. REV. 577, 589 (1990).
153. Id. at 591.
154. See generally George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON.
& MGT. SCI. 3 (1971); ROBERT E. MCCORMICK & ROBERT D. TOLuSON, POLITICIANS,
LEGISLATION, AND THE ECONOMY: AN INQUIRY INTO THE INTEREST-GROUP THEORY OF
GOVERNMENT (1981).
155. See Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416
(1956); Wallace E. Oates, The Effects of Property Taxes and Local Public Spending on Property
Values: An Empirical Study of Tax Capitalization and the Tiebout Hypothesis, 77 J. POL. ECON.
957 (1969) (demonstrating that local taxes and school expenditures resulted in comparable
increases in property values, supporting the hypothesis that consumer behavior is rational).
156. E.g., REPORT TO PRESIDENT BUSH AND SECRETARY KEMP OF THE ADVISORY
COMMISSION OF REGULATORY BARRIERS TO AFFORDABLE HOUSING, NOT IN MY BACK YARD:
REMOVING BARRIERS TO AFFORDABLE HOUSING 4 (1990) (noting evidence suggesting that "an
increase of 20 to 35 percent in housing prices attributable to excessive regulation is not uncom-
mon in the areas of the country that are most severely affected").
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A third approach, which we consider likely, is an evolution back towards
recognition of individual property rights under per se rules and increased
judicial scrutiny. Extraordinary dicta in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey,'57 states that the Court is unwilling to make radical
changes in important jurisprudential areas without compelling need. Justices
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, writing for the majority, found that "only
two... decisional lines from the past century" present such "sustained and
widespread debate"'58  as Roe v. Wade.159  They are Plessy v.
Ferguson," later overruled in Brown v. Board of Education,"' and
Lochner v. New York," the "demise" of which was "signalled"'" in
West Coast Hotel v. Parrish."6 Brown recognized that those who were
segregated were stigmatized with a "badge of inferiority.""~ As for West
Coast Hotel, the Court in Casey rather blithely states in passing that the
Depression has given "most people" the "unmistakable" lesson that
contractual freedom at the heart of substantive due process "rested on
fundamentally false factual assumptions about the capacity of a relatively
unregulated market to satisfy minimal levels of human welfare."" While
the Court's characterization of Lochner and West Coast Hotel might reflect
outmoded conventional wisdom, 67 the Court's skepticism about the role of
market forces further decreases any possibility that it would make a sudden
and sweeping change in the balance between property rights and the police
power. Both West Coast Hotel and Brown, the Court stated in Casey,
157, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992) (generally upholding the abortion rights enunciated in Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
158. 112 S. Ct. at 2813.
159. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that the Constitution protects a woman's right to terminate
her pregnancy in its early stages).
160. 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (enunciating the "separate but equal" doctrine).
161. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (repudiating segregation).
162. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
163. 112 S. Ct. at 2812.
164. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
165. 112 S. Ct. at 2813 (quoting 347 U.S. at 494-95).
166. 112 S. Ct. at 2812.
167. According to James Q Wilson, "[w]e must be stuck at every turn by the importance of
ideas. Regulation itself is such an idea; deregulation is another.... To the extent [that] an
agency can choose, its choices will be importantly shaped by what its executives learned in
college a decade or two earlier." JAMES Q.WILSON, THE POLTICS OF REGULATION 393 (1980),
quoted in THOMAS K. MCCRAw, PROPHETS OF REGULATION 303 (1984). In any event, a new
generation of policy makers has become convinced that "many of the [New Deal] independent
commissions... had since been captured by the very interests that these agencies had ben set
up to regulate." Op. cit. at 303. Similarly, scholars have expressed convincing doubts that the
"unregulated market" was the cause of the Depression and government its cure. See, e.g.,
MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA JACOBSON SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES (1963) (asserting that overly-restrictive monetary policy was principally to blame).
Indeed, just as traditional welfare economics is predicated upon failures in the market, public
choice economics uses economic analysis to discern failures in the political system. See
generally JAMES M. BUCHANAN, Er AL., EDS., TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING
SOCIETY (1980). For a good recent example with a useful bibliography, see RICHARD E.
WAGNER, To PROMOTE THE GENERAL WELFARE (1989).
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"rested on facts, or an understanding of facts, changed from these which
furnished the claimed justifications for the earlier constitutional resolu-
tions." 1" Roe, the Court concluded, "presents no such occasion. " "
B. The Role of Nollan
The Supreme Court's decision in Lucas'7 makes its landmark
Nollan" decision even more crucial. Within the next few years, courts
will be adjudicating cases that will determine the ultimate contours of Lucas.
Important issues that must be worked out include reexamining the numerator
and denominator of the "takings fraction," discerning whether the totality of
deprivation test should be liberalized, and reviewing property rights and
nuisance under state law.
In the course of this litigation there will be much fact-specific evidence
respecting the nature of the landowners nominal interest," the nature of
any "background principals" of state "property and nuisance" law that
"inhere" in his title." This evidence, in turn, will give judges greater
opportunity to examine whether specific regulations have a "sufficient nexus"
with the legitimate state purposes that they purport to serve. This is true
under the rational basis test, which is marked by deference to economic and
social legislation. It would be even more true should the courts adopt an
explicit or implicit heightened scrutiny or reasonable basis test for property
rights.1
74
Yee v. City of Escondido'75 hints at the crucial role that Nollan might
play in subsequent cases. As noted earlier, 76 Yee held that the Loretto per
se test for permanent physical takings was not applicable when a landowner
could terminate the use that gave rise to the regulations. While the holding
was quite ordinary, Justice O'Connor's dicta on regulatory takings potentially
is of considerable significance.
Yee came to the Court as the result of an ingenious extension of Loretto
developed by Ninth Circuit Judge Alex Kozinski in Hall v. City of Santa
168. 112 S. Ct. at 2813.
169. Id.
170. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992). See supra text
accompanying notes 90-117.
171. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987). See supra text
accompanying notes 78-89.
172. Le., the conventional interest in land that the deed to the landowner purported to grant.
173. 112 S. Ct. 2900 & n.16.
174. See infra part III.F.
175. 112 S. Ct. 1522 (1992).
176. See supra text accompanying notes 124-28.
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Barbara.1" He found that a physical taking would occur when a mobile
home park tenant could "monetize" the future benefits of rent control by
selling his mobile home for an inflated price reflecting his alienable right to
rent a space in the park at a low rent." This argument was rejected by
a California appellate court in Yee, 1" and by the Supreme Court on the
physical takings issue."
However, Justice O'Connor noted that the sitting tenant capturing all of
the value of rent control to the exclusion of the landlord and subsequent
tenants "might have some bearing on whether the ordinance causes a
regulatory taking, as it may shed some light on whether there is a sufficient
nexus between the effect of the ordinance and the objectives it is supposed
to advance."18 "The same may be said of petitioners' contention that the
ordinance amounts to compelled physical occupation because it deprives
petitioners of the ability to choose their incoming tenants. Again, this effect
may be relevant to a regulatory taking argument, as it may be one factor a
reviewing court would wish to consider."" Justice O'Connor's opinion
also stated that the landowner would have standing to raise such claims.1 3
These issues were raised in Hall,"8' where Judge Kozinski pointed to
a number of non-economic factors that might make a landlord value the right
to choose one prospective tenant over another.1"  More importantly, he
had advocated meaningful judicial review:
177. 833 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 940 (1988) (upholding cause of
action). Accord Pinewood Estates of Mich. v. Barnegat Township Leveling Bd., 898 F.2d 347
(3d Cir. 1990). See also Azul Pacifico, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 948 F.2d 575 (1991)
(holding based on Hall).
178. Juxtaposed state laws and local ordinances provided for strict rent controls without
vacancy decontrol and required the park owner to accept the buyer of a departing tenant's mobile
home as his successor. 112 S. Ct. at 1526-27.
179. Yee v. City of Escondido, 274 Cal.Rptr. 551, 556 (App. 1990), review denied, 1991
Cal. Lexis 353 (Cal. Supreme Ct. 1991), aff'd 112 S. Ct. 1522 (1992) (conjecturing that any
value added to a selling tenant's mobile home by dint of rent control only removed an
"artificially and perhaps unfairly low" value caused by "excessive" rents).
180. 112 S. Ct. at 1529. ("Ordinary rent control often transfers wealth from landlords to
tenants by reducing the landlords' income and the tenants' monthly payments, although it does
not cause a one-time transfer of value as occurs with mobile homes." The premium that the
park tenant might obtain on the sale of his mobile home merely makes "this wealth transfer more
visible than in the ordinary case." (citing Richard A. Epstein, Rent Control and the Theory of
Efficient Regulation, 54 BROOK. L. REv. 741, 758-59 (1988)). Professor Epstein and the
Justices are odd bedfellows, given a fuller explication of Epstein's views: "Rent control is
politically palatable and constitutionally allowable because it is a form of disguised confiscation.
Once that confiscation is made explicit, the practice cannot survive criticism. When the tenant
sells the landlord's reversion and pockets the landlord's money, the situation become.s clear
enough for all to see. Hall embodies an unconstitutional rent control scheme, but no more so
than any other." Id. at 759.
181. 112 S. Ct. at 1530.
182. Id.
183. While certiorari had been limited to the physical takings issue, appellant had standing
for a facial challenge of the ordinance on a regulatory takings basis. 112 S. Ct. at 1530.
184. Hall v. City of Santa Barbara, 833 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir. 1986).
185. 833 F.2d at 1279 n.23.
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Here, the Santa Barbara City Council enacted the ordinance to alleviate
what it perceived as "a critical shortage of low and moderate income
housing." .... If appellants' allegations are substantiated, there would be
significant doubt whether these purposes are achieved, or could rationally be
thought achievable, by means of the ordinance.
If appellants are able to prove their allegations, it would seem that the
Santa Barbara ordinance will do little more than give a windfall to current
mobile park tenants at the expense of current mobile park owners. If, as
appellants allege, the ordinance has resulted in a substantial increase in the
market price of mobile homes subject to the ordinance, this may well hinder
rather than assist lower-income families seeking access to rental units in
mobile park homes .... 116
C. The Increased Role of "Ownership" Under Lucas
1. The Shift in Focus From Police Power to Ownership Rights
The aspect of the 1991-1992 Term most likely to enhance property rights
is Justice Scalia's admission in Lucas that police power regulation of real
property really is based not upon what property law traditionally has
regarded as "nuisance," but rather upon governmental implementation of
policies for "expected widespread public benefit and applicable to similarly
situated property." 1" This notion of benefit coupled with generalized
burdens implicates Justice Holmes' "average reciprocity of advantage" of all
interested parties. 88 The idea is that landowners are in a real sense the
subject of takings, but they will be compensated in kind through the
advantages that will inure to them by dint of similar restrictions imposed on
others. This is the converse of the requirement of Armstrong v. United
States"' that compensation must be paid when burdens are placed upon a
few which "in fairness and justice" should be imposed upon the general
public. For Justice Scalia, "reciprocity of advantage" can work only if
landowners only incidentally required to suffer regulatory deprivations of
value. Unlike Justice Stevens, who would regard the regulatory scheme in
Lucas covering the entire South Carolina coastline as "similarly situated
property" for police power purposes,119 Justice Scalia would not so regard
any regulation directed at land as such. Given the indeterminacy of
regulations as "harm preventing" or "benefit conferring," he insists that
regulations must be analogous to those upheld in Employment Division v.
186. 833 F.2d at 1280-81.
187. 112 S. Ct. at 2897 (quoting Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 438 U.S. at 133-34
n.30).
188. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
189. 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
190. 112 S. Ct. at 2924 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
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Smith,191 where rules of general application affected religious observances
but were not aimed at religion per se.' 9 In cases where a property owner
commits what is understood in state law to be a public or private nuisance,
Scalia expounds that the state may proscribe such conduct, not under the
police power, but rather because such uses are not encompassed by the
owner's title to begin with."r
Generally speaking, Justice Scalia clearly is correct when he posits that
the law of real property is a better anchor for individual rights than the
police power.194 The law of real property has a solid historical record of
distrust for novel interests (that might serve to increase transactions
costs) 95 and restraints on alienability (i.e., hindrance of the market).1"
It is not merely coincidental that the recent "revolution" in American
landlord-tenant law is associated with a switch in the governing regime from
property to contract.19
Lucas could be seen as categorizing land use regulations into three types:
regulations incidentally affecting property (e.g., a state business income tax
incorporating in-state asset values as a factor); regulations affecting conduct
that never was incident to a valid property right (e.g., ownership of part of
a stream bed does not encompass a "property right" to dump toxins in the
stream); and others (e.g., the great bulk of zoning and other land use
regulations). Proper treatment of this last category would present the most
difficulty, and we see a heightened scrutiny or reasonable basis test as a
solution. 9
2. The Problem of Circularity
As Justice Scalia acknowledged in Lucas, even under the per se test for
regulatory deprivations of all economically beneficial use, there would be a
necessary limitation on landowners' uses of their property in order to prevent
191. 494 U.S. 872, 878-879 (1990) (discharging Native American for ritualistic use of
peyote).
192. 112 S. Ct. at 2900 n. 14.
193. 112 S. Ct. at 2900. See supra text accompanying note 117.
194. 112 S. Ct. at 2902 ("There is no doubt some leeway in a court's interpretation of what
existing state law permits-but not remotely as much, we think, as in a legislative crafting of
the reasons for its confiscatory regulation.").
195. A modem application of this principle involves the extent to which a landowner could
create new forms of servitudes. For contrasting views, see, e.g., Susan French, Toward a
Modem Law of Servitudes: Reweaving the Ancient Strands, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1261, 1289-
1310 (1982); and Richard A. Epstein, Notice and Freedom of Contract in the Law of Servitudes,
55 S. CAL. L. REv. 1353, 1358-64 (1982)
196. See, e.g., RICHARD R. POWELL & PATRICK J. ROHAN, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY 848
(1950, 1992) (social policy favors alienability).
197. See Edward H. Rabin, The Revolution in Residential Landlord-Tenant Law: Causes and
Consequences, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 517 (1984) for a comprehensive summary.
198. See infra part III.F.
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harm to "public lands and resources, or adjacent private property." 199 Just
as it would have to do if it sued for public nuisance, the state "must identify
background principles of nuisance and property law that prohibit the uses he
now intends. "I While these limitations must preexist the
landowner's rights, "changed circumstances or new knowledge may make
what was previously permissible no longer so."21
Property rights extend up to the boundary of nuisance. In the instance
of a "total taking," property rights cannot be trumped by the state's policy
power because of the Lucas per se rule. However, the police power is in
large part based on nuisance, and nuisance delimits the scope of property
rights.
In spite of Justice Scalia's optimism, there is considerable cause to
expect that regulation might grow at the expense of property rights. A recent
overview of the Court's interpretation of the Contracts Clause by Judge
Richard Posner provides a troubling analogy:
[TIhe Supreme Court has read the contract clause so that it means very
little, at least when the government is not a party to the contract. The
Court has inserted the word "reasonably" before the word "impairing,"
and has adopted "a broad, loose, and forgiving standard of reasonableness
. . . . It stresses the importance of whether the contracting parties are
operating in an already regulated field and can therefore anticipate the
possibility of new regulation that will alter the obligations imposed by the
contract .... So the more the state regulates, the more it can regulate
without violating the Constitution-a bootstrapping approach if ever there
was one. And when the state is not a party to the contract, its judgment
regarding both ends and means is to be given great deference.v
Second, Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Lucas also noted an "inherent
tendency towards circularity," but seemed (perhaps naively) unconcerned
because "[t]he expectations protected by the Constitution are based on
objective rules and customs that can be understood as reasonable by all
parties involved."' His link of the circularity problem to whether a
"deprivation is contrary to reasonable, investment-backed expectations"'
is somewhat troubling. As one of the Penn Central balancing test factors,
"investment-backed expectation" relates to the owner, not to the parcel. Yet
the Lucas per se test is applicable only where the owner is deprived of
market value, which, being objective, must relate to the value of the parcel.
199. 112 S. Ct. at 2901.
200. 112 S. Ct. at 2901-02.
201. 112 S. Ct. at 2901 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 827, cmt. g (1977)).
202. Chicago Bd. of Realtors, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 819 F.2d 732, 744 (7th Cir. 1987)
(Posner, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
203. 112 S. Ct. at 2903 (Kennedy, J. concurring) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967) (holding Fourth Amendment protections are defined by reasonable expectations of
privacy).
204. 112 S. Ct. at 2903 (Kennedy, J. concurring).
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Justice Kennedy would further muddy the waters by rejecting as the
boundary of property rights the common law of nuisance, which he finds
"too narrow a confine for the exercise of regulatory power in a complex and
interdependent society."' °  He would substitute consideration of "all
reasonable expectations whatever their source."6 This would exacerbate
the circuity problem.
But, as political scientist Dennis Coyle argues, the concerns for liberty
and equality that gave rise to the "double standard" of Carolene Products are
now eroding the double standard.' The indeterminacy of regulations as
"harm-preventing" or "benefit-conferring"" 5 adds to this process.
D. Discerning Whether the Deprivation was "Total"
1. The Difficulty in Showing "Total" Deprivation
While the Lucas per se test is built upon the fact that the landowner is
left "no economically viable use," that determination respecting Lucas's own
lots is unconvincing.' Making an affirmative case for the presence of
value, Justice Blackmun noted that Lucas could exclude others and use the
land for recreation or camping.21°
With respect to most types of land use regulation, Justice Scalia's
observation is correct that total deprivations of value would be in "relatively
rare situations."211 Indeed, one could postulate that the only people who
would write legislation achieving a total wipe-out would be the same "stupid
staff" who Justice Scalia postulates would cast the regulations as "benefit-
conferring" rather than "harm-preventing. "212 It is too easy to draft
regulations permitting such small benefits as passive recreation. Indeed, a
boiler-plate savings clause might provide owners who otherwise would loose
"all economically feasible use" of their lands with a modicum of administra-
tive relief.
Two important situations in which there is a realistic possibility that
owners would be deprived of all value involve scenic preservation and
wetlands regulation. One significant recent case, Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v.
205. Id.
206. 112 S. Ct. 2903 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S.
590, 593 (1962)).
207. Dennis Coyle, The Circle Unbroken: Property Rights and the Eclipse of the D~ouble
Standard (typescript, 1989), cited in Carol M. Rose, Property Rights, Regulatory Regimes and
the New Takings Jurisprudence-An Evolutionary Approach, 57 TENN. L. REV. 577, 580 &
n.20 (1990).
208. See supra text accompanying notes 112-16.
209. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
210. 112 S. Ct. at 2908 (Blacklnun, J. dissenting).
211. Id. at 2894.
212. Id. at 2897-99.
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United States,"' involved the denial of a fill permit for a New Jersey
coastal subdivision. Chief Judge Loren Smith of the U.S. Claims Court
ruled that the environmental regulation had decreased the value of plaintiff's
property from $2,658,000 to $12,500, resulting in a diminution in value of
over 99%. While the government argued that neighbors might want to
acquire the property to ensure their continued unobstructed water view,
Judge Smith concluded that "it is difficult to imagine why a rational property
owner would spend additional money to purchase that which the government
already has bestowed."" 4 More generally, he relied upon Olson v. United
States for the principle that the judge, as finder of fact, "must discount
proposed uses that do not meet a 'showing of reasonable probability that the
land is both physically adaptable for such use and that there is a demand for
such use in the reasonably near future'."2"6
Although he referred to the remaining value as "nominal," this fact was
coupled with the Claims Court's earlier determination of a "lack of a
countervailing substantial legitimate state interest." The result was finding
for the landowner under the Penn Central balancing test.217
In post-Lucas, cases where the landowner arguably has a small residual
value, trial judges may choose to invoke Penn Central as well as Lucas, or
may exercise flexibility in determining the remaining value to be zero under
Olson.
2. The "Takings Fraction"
Ever since Justice Holmes warned in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon"8 that "if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking,"
the question has arisen "too far with respect to what?" In Mahon itself,
Holmes' holding for the coal company emphasized that the company's
mineral estate was recognized in Pennsylvania as an "estate in land," and the
statute "purports to abolish" it.219  On the other hand, Justice Brandeis
argued in dissent that the value of the coal kept in place because of the
restriction should be compared with the value of the fee simple. "The rights
of an owner as against the public are not increased by dividing the interests
in his property into surface and subsoil."22 Brandeis' view is forcefully
213.21 Cl.Ct. 153 (1990).
214. Id. at 159.
215. 292 U.S. 246 (1934).
216. 21 CI.Ct. at 158 (quoting United States v. 341.45 Acres of Land, 633 F.2d 108, 111
(8th Cir.1980), cert. denied sub nom. Bassett v. United States, 451 U.S. 938 (1981), (in turn
relying on Olson).
217. 21 C1.Ct. at 160. Loveladies Harbor has been appealed, and is now awaiting decision
by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
218. 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
219. 260 U.S. at 414.
220. 260 U.S. at 419 (Brandeis, J. dissenting).
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represented among modern commentators. Holmes' treatment of the "estate
in land" as the interest completely taken would be referred to by Professor
Radin as "conceptual severance," 22' a term that Professor Michelman
suggests might be recast as "entitlement chopping."'"
While Justice Scalia's opinion in Lucas readily concedes the prob-
lem,' he offers no solution. He does, however, term "extreme" and
"unsupportable" the view of the New York Court of Appeals in Penn Central
that the relevant denominator included all of the railroad's considerable other
holdings in the vicinity of Grand Central Terminal.'
This suggests that the Court will take a common sense approach to the
takings denominator, perhaps through extending a presumption of validity to
estates commonly employed in the vicinity in similar projects where specific
regulatory concerns were not an issue. Correspondingly, the state could not
merge for takings purposes lots or interests which customarily would be
treated as separate for real property purposes. While the problem should not
be minimized, the difficulties are no greater than corresponding issues of
form versus substance under the Internal Revenue Code.2  It seems
unlikely, in light of the principles noted in the preceding sentence, that courts
would give credence to novel interests palpably designed to court a
regulatory wipe-out.22 7 This analysis is parallel to Justice Scalia's conclu-
sion that common law nuisance is apt to be absent (and hence the land-
owner's property right present) when a pattern of development has been long
engaged in or where similarly situated owners will be allowed to continue
uses denied to the plaintiff.
221. Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Properly: Cross Currents in the
Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1667, 1676 (1988).
222. Frank Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1601 (1988).
223. 112 S. Ct. at 2894 n.7 ("Regrettably, the rhetorical force of our 'deprivation of all
economically feasible use' rule is greater than its precision. . . . When, for example, a
regulation requires a developer to leave 90% of a rural tract in its natural state, it is unclear
whether we would analyze the situation as one in which the owner has been deprived of all
economically beneficial use of the burdened portion ...or as one in which the owner has
suffered a mere diminution in value of the tract as a whole....").
224. 112 S. Ct. at 2894. The fact that each of Lucas' two lots was owned in fee simple ("an
estate with a rich tradition of protection") and that the South Carolina trial court had determined
that Lucas was deprived of all value allowed the Court to "avoid this difficulty in the present
case." Id.
225. 112 S. Ct. at 2894 n.7.
226. See, e.g., Orrisch v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 395 (1970) (special allocation of
depreciation to partner not supported by "substantial economic effect"); Hort v. Commissioner,
313 U.S. 28 (1941) (landlord's receipt for cancellation of long-term lease substitute for recurring
rentals and not sale of capital asset). C
. 
Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5 (1937) (gift of life
interest in a trust transfer of property, not transfer of income).
227. We would regard as an example of such an interest the right, hypothesized in Justice
Stevens' dissent, to build a multi-family structure only. This would become worthless when
subsequent regulations permit the construction of only a single-family structure. 112 S. Ct. at
2919-20 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
228. 112 S. Ct. at 2901.
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Loveladies Harbora9 provides an insight into what might become a
typical "takings fraction" problem. The "upland" portion of the tract in
question did not have the same recreational or residential appeal as the
coastal portion. There was no evidence that, given the denial of a fill
permit, infrastructure would be constructed that would provide a market for
upland lots. Presumably a buyer of these lots prior to the imposition of
environmental regulations could have argued that there had been a complete
wipe-out. The owner of a coastal lot would have had a more difficult case.
E. The Implausibility of Limiting Lucas to Total Deprivations of Value
Central to the Supreme Court's holding in Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council' is its applicability only to regulatory deprivations "of
all economically beneficial or productive use of land." 1 As previously
discussed, such deprivations would be not only "relatively rare," but could
be rendered non-existent through the insertion in regulations of boiler-plate
savings clauses. 2  Given the practicalities of real estate development, the
protection accorded by Lucas might well be illusory. Under such circum-
stances, courts may well adopt a "deprivation of substantially all value" or
"essentially all value" approach. 3  As Lucas reveals, most land use
regulation is directed towards the enhancement of societal wealth, and not,
to use Professor Sax's term, toward "moral wrongdoing" by landowners?"4
Therefore, the question of why some landowners should suffer substantial
(albeit not total) reductions in value becomes more acute. Perhaps it was the
realization that courts inevitably would be tempted to relax the requirement
for a total wipe-out that led Justice Stevens in his Lucas dissent to be so
concerned about the "wholly arbitrary" application of Lucas to the 100%
taking and its complete non-applicability to the 95% taking. 5  Justice
Scalia's somewhat lame response was that life is sometimes unfair,' and
that, besides, those with 95% deprivations have the benefit of the Penn
Central balancing test. 7
This last point brings up a more fundamental reason for the instability
of Justice Scalia's deprivation-of-all-value approach. Lucas creates not only
229. Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 21 CI.Ct. 153 (1990). See supra text
accompanying notes 213-16.
230. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
231. Id. at 2893 (emphasis added).
232. See supra text accompanying notes 211-12.
233. This process might be eased by realistic appraisals of the land's market value in light of
the fact that potential purchasers in many cases could obtain the benefits they seek by freeriding
on the regulations. See supra text accompanying notes 213-16.
234. See Joseph Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 50 (1964).
235. 112 S. Ct. at 2919 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
236. 112 S. Ct. 2895 n.8. ("Takings law is full of these 'all-or-nothing' situations.")
237. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978). See supra
text accompanying notes 69-71.
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a categorical exclusion from Penn Central balancing, but also a new way of
conceptualizing the interface of police power regulation and property rights.
In the world of Lucas, traditional police power restrictions on land use are
transmuted into either limitations that inhere in the owner's title itself (if they
are the equivalent of public or private nuisances) or societal constraints that
have an incidental impact on landowners (such as general schemes of
taxation). 3 It is the daily task of courts to apply different technical rules
to different fact patterns. It is quite a different thing, however, to expect
judges to adjust their overall conception of the nature of police power
restrictions and ownership rights from case to case, depending on whether
the regulatory deprivation of value in the given case had reached totality or
had fallen just short of that mark.
F. A "Heightened Scrutiny" or "Reasonable Basis" Approach
A number of factors suggest that the Court might move towards
substituting some form of "heightened scrutiny" or "reasonable basis" test
for governmental restrictions on real property in place of the present
"rational basis" (or "conceivable basis") test. 39  First, there have been
many suggestions that the Court in general adopt a different approach. Some
of this is attributable to dissatisfaction with the fact that the Court never has
made the three-tiered system clear.' Alternatives have been advocated by
Justice Marshall 1 and by commentators. 2  Professor Gerald Gunther
has suggested that courts might make critical determinations in cases before
them without formally abandoning the rational basis test-which he calls
rational basis "with bite."' Professor Tribe advocates a process of
"explicit judicial debate" that would categorize who is eligible for heightened
scrutiny.? Professors Ronald Rotunda and John Nowak suggest that "it
is possible that the Court is moving towards converting the rationality test
into a 'reasonableness' test similar to that employed during the 1900-1936
era."245
238. See supra text accompanying notes 90-117.
239. See supra text accompanying note 54.
240. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALLAW 1614 (2d ed. 1988).
("The Court has never provided a coherent explanation of the characteristics which, either
overtly or covertly, trigger intermediate review.")
241. He called for a balancing test in equal protection cases. See, e.g., Massachusetts Bd.
of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 318-21 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
242. See, e.g., JOHN H. ELY, DEMoCRAcY AND DISTRUST (1980).
243. Gerald Gunther, Forward, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972).
244. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1445-1446 (2d ed. 1988)
(Economic regulations would still be governed by the "conceivable basis" test, as a "means of
upholding all but the most brazenly and blatantly irrational governmental measures.").
245. See RONAiD D. ROTUNDA, ET AL., TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, SUBSTANCE
& PROCEDURE § 15.4, text at n.62-63 (1986).
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Second, as previously discussed,' the Court already has adopted
heightened scrutiny in at least one land use regulation case, City of Cleburne
v. Cleburne Living Center.24 There, the Court's refusal to treat the
mentally retarded as a suspect class did not hinder it from a searching factual
inquiry regarding the circumstances under which the City turned down a
special use permit for a group home. While undoubtedly sympathy for the
plight of retarded persons who might otherwise be homeless entered into the
Court's thinking, many common types of governmental regulations lead to
a lack of affordable housing for the young, the poor, and minorities.'
Professor Tribe, while apparently sympathetic to the result in Cleburne,
implicitly acknowledges the breadth of these concerns when he warns that
this type of "covert" heightened scrutiny might mean that "even routine
economic regulations may from time to time succumb to a form of review
reminiscent of the Lochner era .... 2"
Third, the recent pivotal cases of Nollan v. California Coastal Commis-
sion and Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council" together seem
inexorably to presage a higher standard of review. Nollan seems totally
inconsistent with the deference to the legislature that marks the "conceivable
basis" test. As previously discussed, Nollan's "sufficient nexus" holding'
is in itself an invocation of heightened scrutiny. When this holding is
coupled with the intensive, fact-based inquiries into the nature of the
regulation, the landowner's title, and limitations on that title that inhere from
"background principles of. . . property and nuisance" law, 3 it would be
very difficult for a court to pull back to a deferential approach. On this point
it is instructive to note that, in the face of Justice Blackmun's sharp
objection,' the Court in Lucas performed its own critical review of the
South Carolina Beachfront Management Act. It concluded that neither the
specific provisions of the Act nor the South Carolina Supreme Court
246. See supra text accompanying notes 72-77.
247. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
248. See supra text accompanying notes 149-51. Indeed, regulations often deprive these
groups of entrepreneurial opportunities that would allow them to afford suitable housing under
present land use regulations. See generally on protecting economic liberty for individuals of
modest social circumstances, CLINT BOUCK, UNFINISHED BUSINESS: A CIVIL RIGHTS STRATEGY
FOR AMERICA'S THIRD CENTURY 47-91 (1990). It could be said that "[c]ivil' rights and
'property' rights are indistinguishable in origin and have the same instrumental justifications."
William H. Riker, Civil Rights and Property Rights, in LIBERTY, PROPERTY, AND THE FUTURE
OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 49, 49 (Ellen Frankel Paul & Howard Dickman, eds.
1990).
249. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1445-1446 (2d ed. 1988)
("[F]ar better" that "explicit judicial debate" decide who is eligible for heightened scrutiny.
Economic regulations would still be governed by the "conceivable basis" test, as a "means of
upholding all but the most brazenly and blatantly irrational governmental measures.").
250. 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987).
251. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
252. See supra text accompanying notes 78-89.
253. 112 S. Ct. at 2900.
254. 112 S. Ct. at 2906 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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deference justified the conclusion that the state legislature's purported intent
was harm-preventing rather than benefit-conferring. 5  Obviously this
process would be greatly hastened if Lucas evolves so as not to be limited to
total deprivation of value cases.'
In recent years some state court decisions have taken the lead in
enhancing property rights, based upon their view of the federal Constitu-
tion,217 or, following Justice Brennan's advice, 5 their state constitu-
tion. 9 In the next few years it is inevitable that state courts will hear
many challenges to land use regulations that invoke Nollan and Lucas. It is
likely that some of these courts will fashion decisions, based upon the federal
Constitution or their state constitution, that will change the Lucas "depriva-
tion of all beneficial use" and application of the "conceivable basis" tests as
we have just discussed.
Through this process, these state courts will serve as laboratories in
the formation of legal doctrine that will preserve legitimate governmental
interests, while at the same time continuing the evolving protection of
property rights of which Cleburne, Nollan, and now Lucas play such an
important part.
255. 112 S. Ct. at 2898 & n. 11.
256. See supra part III.D.2.
257. See, e.g., Seawall Associates v. City of New York, 542 N.E.2d 1059 (N.Y. 1989)
(holding ordinance establishing five-year moratorium on conversion, alteration or demolition of
single-room occupancy housing and requiring the owners to restore all units to habitable
condition and lease them at controlled rents for indefinite period to constitute physical taking,
regulatory taking, and lacking essential nexus with its articulated goal).
258. William J. Brennan, The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions
as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535 (1986) (advocating recourse to state
constitutional adjudication to circumvent Supreme Court unwillingness to expand protection for
criminal defendants under equivalent provisions of U.S. Constitution).
259. United Artists Theater Circuit, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 595 A.2d 6 (Penn. 1991),
reargument granted, Aug. 30, 1991 (invalidated under takings clause of Pennsylvania
constitution a Philadelphia Historical Commission mandate that a theater with some art deco
features be maintained in its present state at the owner's expense until the Commission permitted
otherwise).
260. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 344 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting). ("... social
experiments ... in the insulated chambers afforded by the several States .... "); New State
Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). ("It is one of the
happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose,
serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of
the country.")
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